New Limits on MARs in Noncapital Cases – North Carolina Criminal Law

My colleagues have been blogging about some of the changes to our criminal law wrought by recent legislation. Session Law 2025-70 also amends G.S. 15A-1415, which governs the grounds that a defendant may assert by motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and establishes limitations as to time. Whereas the statute previously listed grounds that a defendant may assert by MAR at any time after the verdict, the recent amendments create a seven-year limit on most noncapital MARs. This post addresses the changes to G.S. 15A-1415 (effective Dec. 1, 2025).

Preexisting Limits in G.S. 15A-1415

“A motion for appropriate relief is a post-verdict motion (or a post-sentencing motion where there is no verdict) made to correct errors occurring prior to, during, and after a criminal trial.” State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 535 (1990). General Statutes Chapter 15A, Article 89, dating from 1977, governs the procedure for such motions. As explained in the commentary, the drafters sought to provide a single, unified procedure for raising at the trial level errors that are asserted to have been made during the trial. G.S. Ch. 15A, Art. 89 cmt.; cf. State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 166 (1982) (MAR provided by Article 89 was intended to replace all post-trial motions except habeas corpus).

Even in the best of cases, postconviction relief is designedly difficult to obtain. In general, an MAR must be in writing, state grounds and relief sought, and be accompanied by supporting affidavits. G.S. 15A-1420(a) & (b). If the MAR is based on facts not apparent from the record, the MAR may be denied for failure to file supporting affidavits. See State v. Payne, 312 N.C. 647 (1985); State v. Rhue, 150 N.C. App. 280, 290 (2002). If the MAR is filed by an attorney in superior court, the attorney must certify that there is sound legal basis for the motion and that it is made in good faith. G.S. 15A-1420(a)(1)c1. A trial court may not grant the MAR without this certification. Id. at (a)(5).

Further, an MAR may be denied as procedurally barred if the issue could have been raised earlier. Under G.S. 15A-1419, the trial court has grounds to deny an MAR when the defendant raised or could have raised the same issue in a prior appeal or a previous MAR. The trial court shall deny the MAR on these grounds absent a showing of good cause to excuse these grounds and actual prejudice or that a failure to consider the issue will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. G.S. 15A-1419(b). This statute requires the court to determine whether the defendant’s MAR claim could have been raised in a prior appeal from the judgment. State v. Bell, 387 N.C. 262, 274 (2025).

Even if the procedural bar does not apply, other obstacles are created by G.S. 15A-1415. Whereas the grounds for relief that may be asserted by MAR within ten days of judgement are virtually unlimited, after ten days the eligible grounds are significantly narrower. Hence, “the only grounds” a defendant may assert by MAR more than ten days after judgment include jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, retroactivity claims, and sentencing claims. G.S. 15A-1415(b). A trial court has no authority to grant relief more than ten days after judgment unless the error alleged falls within the statutorily enumerated categories. State v. Harwood, 228 N.C. App. 478, 484 (2013).

Time Limits Established by 1996 Amendments

As originally enacted, G.S. 15A-1415 restricted the grounds that could be asserted by MAR more than ten days after judgment, but there were no other limitations as to time. G.S. 15A-1415 (1977). Additional restrictions, applicable only to capital cases, were introduced by amendments in 1996. Thereafter, in a capital case, an MAR shall be filed within 120 days from the latest of the following:

(1) The court’s judgment has been filed, but the defendant failed to perfect a timely appeal;

(2) The mandate issued by a court of the appellate division on direct appeal . . . and the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has expired without a petition being filed;

(3) The United States Supreme Court denied a timely petition for writ of certiorari of the decision on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of North Carolina;

(4) Following the denial of discretionary review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court denied a timely petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision on direct appeal by the North Carolina Court of Appeals;

(5) The United States Supreme Court granted [a] timely petition for writ of certiorari of the decision on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of North Carolina or North Carolina Court of Appeals, but subsequently left the defendant’s conviction and sentence undisturbed; or

(6) The appointment of postconviction counsel for an indigent capital defendant.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a); cf. State v. Williams, 351 N.C. 465, 467 (2000) (describing events listed as triggering the deadline). At the same time, G.S. 15A-1419 was amended to provide that the trial court has grounds to deny an MAR in a capital case based on untimely filing. 15A-1419(a)(4).

Before 1996, the limited grounds that could be asserted by MAR at any time after judgment included claims of newly discovered evidence. G.S. 15A-1415(b)(6) (1977). The 1996 amendments gave claims of newly discovered evidence (including recanted testimony) their own unique timeline. A new subsection was introduced into G.S. 15A-1415, exempting claims of newly discovered evidence from “the time limitations herein,” but an MAR based on newly discovered evidence still had to be filed “within a reasonable time of its discovery.” G.S. 15A-1415(c). The procedural bar of G.S. 15A-1419 was also modified to account for such claims. G.S. 15A-1419(e).

Time Limits Established by 2025 Amendments

The recent amendments to G.S. 15A-1415 build upon the time limits added in 1996, making the list of clock-starting events previously applicable only to capital cases apply to noncapital cases as well. Whereas a capital MAR based on the enumerated grounds previously should have been filed within 120 days of a triggering event, now a capital defendant may file such an MAR within 120 days. Whereas noncapital MARs based on the enumerated grounds previously operated under no time limit, now a noncapital defendant may file such an MAR within seven years from the latest of the same triggering events (except that appointment of postconviction counsel is not a triggering event for noncapital cases). Session Laws 2025-70 § 15.(a). The same legislation modifies G.S. 15A-1419 to provide untimeliness as a basis to deny a noncapital MAR. Session Laws 2025-70 § 15.(b).

As noted above, the 1996 amendments exempted only claims of newly discovered evidence from the time limitations established. G.S. 15A-1415(c). The 2025 amendments enlarge the exemption to encompass a short list of enumerated grounds: (1) claims of newly discovered evidence, (2) retroactivity claims, and (3) claims that the defendant is subject to release because a sentence has been fully served. The exemption also applies (4) when the defendant can show, pursuant to G.S. 15A-1419, good cause to excuse untimely filing and actual prejudice or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Session Laws 2025-70 § 15.(a). Notwithstanding the time limitations, a defendant may file an MAR based on the enumerated grounds at any time if the prosecutor consents to the filing. Session Laws 2025-70 § 15.(a). (The amendment refers to the DA for the district where the case originated, but the MAR must have been filed in the district where the defendant was indicted in any event. G.S. 15A-1420(b1)(1).)

The amendments to G.S. 15A-1415 and 15A-1419 become effective December 1, 2025, and apply to “verdicts entered on or after that date.” Session Laws 2025-70, § 15.(c).

Analysis

Practitioners should not read too much into the reference to “verdicts” in the bill’s effective date. The original Article 89 made similar reference to verdicts to denote the end of the trial phase and the beginning of postconviction. The availability of relief, when appropriate, is not denied to those defendants who pled guilty merely on account of the lack of a verdict. See Handy, 326 N.C. at 536; cf. State v. Alexander, 380 N.C. 572, 588 (2022) (the term “verdict” in G.S. 15A-269, governing motion for DNA testing, did not limit availability of relief to defendants convicted by a jury).

Questions may arise in how to determine the triggering event for the seven-year time limit. As noted above, the 1996 amendments created a time limit for capital MARs, and the list of triggering events was tailored to capital cases, half of them involving a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court. In noncapital cases, expiration of the time for seeking review may be dispositive. The triggering events include that the court’s judgment has been filed, but the defendant failed to perfect a timely appeal. G.S. 15A-1415(a)(1). For noncapital defendants entitled to appeal as a matter of right, entry of judgment without a timely appeal would trigger the seven-year window to file an MAR. The same would probably be true for noncapital defendants who pled guilty and whose right to appeal is more strictly circumscribed by statute. See G.S. 15A-1444(e). Certainly, a defendant’s failure to seek timely appellate review, whether by direct appeal or certiorari, should make the trial court’s entry of judgment the triggering event for the seven-year window to file a noncapital MAR. See G.S. 15A-101(a) (the term “appeal” generally also includes appellate review on writ of certiorari).

The enumerated triggering events also include an appellate court’s issuance of its mandate on direct appeal and expiration of the time for filing a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court without a petition being filed. G.S. 15A-1415(a)(2). An appellate court typically issues the mandate within 20 days of its opinion. N.C. R. App. P. 32(b). A petition seeking review by the N.C. Supreme Court after a determination by the N.C. Court of Appeals must be filed within 15 days after the mandate. N.C. R. App. p. 15(b). A petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court generally must be filed within 90 days of the lower court’s judgment (including the denial of review by a state court of last resort). U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13.1. Hence, for a noncapital defendant who appeals directly to the N.C. Court of Appeals, that court’s issuance of its mandate (absent timely petition for further review) would trigger the seven-year window to file an MAR. If the N.C. Supreme Court grants a petition for review and produces an opinion, that court’s issuance of its mandate would be the later event. (When filing such a petition, defendants might be more inclined to seek a stay of the prior mandate. Absent a stay, the time that an unsuccessful petition is pending would count against the MAR clock.) Presumably, issuance of the mandate is the crux, not whether review was obtained by direct appeal.

Similarly ambiguous is the strictness of the filing period. The 1996 amendments provided that an MAR in a capital case shall be filed within a prescribed period. See Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren Cnty., 368 N.C. 360, 365 (2015) (the word “shall” is generally imperative or mandatory). The more permissive language of the 2025 amendment arguably lacks the same force. See State v. Waycaster, 375 N.C. 232, 240 (2020) (the word “may” is usually permissive and not mandatory). Given the stated intent to “set limits” on MARs in noncapital cases, however, and the amendment to G.S. 15A-1419(a) allowing for denial based on untimely filing, the plain language – that a defendant “may file” an MAR within the prescribed period – should probably be construed to mean that a defendant must file an MAR within that time. See State v. Ellison, 296 N.C. App. 227, 242 (2024) (legislative intent is to be derived from a consideration of the entire statute).

Conclusion

Section 15A-1415 still contains the original ten-day time limit, after which the grounds that may be asserted by MAR grow significantly narrower. As explained by the drafters, this restriction was created with a view toward balancing considerations of fundamental fairness with the desirability of finality in criminal cases. See G.S. 15A-1415 cmt. The time limit of the 2025 amendments, like that of the 1996 amendments before it, serves the interest of finality, while the specific exemption from the time limit leaves open an avenue for asserting certain claims in the interest of fairness.

It remains to be seen whether the time limit created by the 2025 amendments will meaningfully deter postconviction litigation in noncapital cases. As illustrated above, the preexisting provisions of Article 89 contain significant obstacles to a defendant’s obtaining relief. But those provisions are only as effective as the litigants are aware of them and the courts enforce them. Prosecutors should remember to argue the procedural bars when they are applicable. Prosecutors in 2032 (seven years from December) should remember to plead the time bar, lest they be deemed to have consented to waiver of the time limitations as provided by the new subsection (c1).