N.C. Court of Appeals (August 6, 2025) – North Carolina Criminal Law

This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on August 6, 2025.

The State presented sufficient evidence to establish that a hammer was used as a dangerous weapon to support conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Blackburn, No. COA24-1016 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The victim was sleeping in his Mazda as he did every night when he was awakened by banging on the outside of his car. Two men pulled the victim from the car and held a gun to his head. Three men threatened to shoot him if he didn’t hand over his money, and when the victim stated he didn’t have any money, the men pushed him against the car facing the vehicle, and one of the men hit the victim with a hammer. The defendant stated he hit the victim with a hammer on the back of the victim’s shoulder, while the victim testified that he was hit on the back of the head and neck, fell to the ground, and lost consciousness for a short period. When he came to, he saw the men driving away in the Mazda. The defendant was apprehended near the stolen vehicle later that night. The defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon after a jury trial.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling on his motion to dismiss, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant’s use of a hammer “endangered or threatened the life” of the victim. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that a dangerous weapon is any instrument likely to produce death or great bodily harm. The victim need not receive serious bodily injury, but rather the State must only show that the weapon was used in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

The Court looked to State v. Jackson, 85 N.C. App. 531, 532 (1987), which specifically dealt with the question of whether a hammer was a dangerous weapon, in explaining that “in determining whether a hammer was dangerous to [a] life…, you would consider the nature of the hammer, the manner in which the defendant used it or threatened to use it, and the size and strength of the defendant as compared to [the victim].” The Court reasoned that in the light most favorable to the State, considering that the victim was in his mid-sixties and the Defendant was a nineteen-year-old young man, the blow to the back of the victim’s head and neck causing the victim to lose consciousness was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude the hammer was used as a dangerous weapon.

(1) Any error in giving self-defense instruction was dismissed as invited error; (2) no discovery violation where in-court identification of defendant was not significantly different from prior statements made by victim; (3) evidence was sufficient for conviction of discharging a firearm within an enclosure to incite fear under G.S. 14-34.10 where statute requires only that the defendant discharge a weapon from within any occupied enclosure; (4) trial court erred by imposing sentence for conviction under G.S. 14-34.10 where defendant was convicted of other crimes carrying greater punishment.

State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The victim was driving when the defendant pulled up alongside her and fired a bullet into her car, shattering the victim’s window. The bullet entered the victim’s left arm and was lodged in her back. In the aftermath of the drive-by shooting, the victim identified the defendant as the shooter on multiple occasions. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of multiple charges, including discharging a weapon from within an enclosure to incite fear under G.S. 14-34.10. The defendant raised multiple claims on appeal.

As to an alleged error in the self-defense instruction, the Court dismissed the defendant’s argument as invited error, noting that the defendant had multiple opportunities to object to the instruction at trial, but trial counsel expressly agreed with the instructions and stated that he had no proposed changes.

As to the claimed discovery violations, the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State complied with G.S. 15A-903 and that the defense had adequate information to prepare his defense. The Court noted that oral statements to a prosecutor need only be provided to the defense if the statements contain significantly new or different information from prior statements. The Court did not find that the in-court identification of the defendant was significantly different from prior identifications of the defendant as the shooter.

As a third issue, the defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for G.S. 14-34.10 (discharging a firearm within an enclosure to incite fear). The defendant argued that the statute required that the defendant and the victim be within the same occupied vehicle at the moment of discharge, while the State argued that the statute required only that the defendant be within any occupied vehicle when firing the weapon. As a matter of first impression, the Court engaged in a lengthy process of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the words “within” and “occupied” in the context of G.S. 14-34.10. This analysis of the plain meaning of the statute led the Court to conclude that the statute requires only that the defendant be within any occupied enclosure upon discharge. The Court thus held that the evidence was sufficient.

Finally, the Court addressed defendant’s argument that he should not have been punished under G.S. 14-34.10 where express language in the statute provides that punishment is proper “unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment.” The Court held that this language created a statutory mandate that was preserved despite the defendant’s failure to object at trial. As defendant’s conduct was punished by multiple other offenses carrying greater punishment, the Court concluded that the defendant was prejudiced in receiving a sentence under G.S. 14-34.10 and arrested judgment on this conviction, remanding for resentencing.

(1) Admission of out-of-court written statement to corroborate in-court testimony was not plain error; (2) prosecutor’s questioning of the witness as to whether the witness was being truthful in court was improper but not reversible error.

State v. Jones, No. COA24-503 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The defendant, along with two friends, decided to rob the victim, the owner of a local grocery store and gas station. The defendant had a conversation about the planned robbery with his cousin who worked at the victim’s store. His cousin subsequently warned the victim that he may be in danger. On the night of the robbery, a codefendant went to the victim’s store to buy gas and returned three times. The co-defendant then picked up the defendant and the other co-defendant, and dropped them off at an intersection where they expected the victim to drive by after leaving the store. When the victim arrived, one of the two began shooting into the vehicle. The two fled the scene without taking any property from the victim. The victim later died of injuries from the drive-by shooting. The defendant’s cousin made a written statement to the police during the investigation.

First, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court committed plain error in allowing an officer to read the cousin’s written statement after the cousin testified. The defendant contended that the written statement was inadmissible for corroborative purposes and was thus hearsay. The defendant also asserted that the statement prejudiced his case in referring to the defendant as a “lowlife” who was part of a group that robbed people. The Court of Appeals stressed that plain error should only be applied in the exceptional case where the error had a probable impact on the outcome of the trial. Noting that the witness’s in-court testimony referred to the defendant’s plans to rob the victim and his association with people engaged in planning robberies, the Court concluded that even if the written statement was not properly admitted for corroborative purposes, the error did not rise to the level of plain error.

Second, the defendant argued that reversible error occurred when the prosecutor asked a co-defendant if he was telling the truth in court (where he testified to information inconsistent with his first statement to law enforcement). The Court of Appeals noted that it is generally improper for counsel to ask a witness whether he has been truthful in his testimony (unless the truthfulness of the witness has been challenged on cross-examination). However, although the question was improper, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error was not reversible error, as the defendant failed to show a reasonable possibility of a different result had the error not been committed.

The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the errors, considered cumulatively, added up to reversible error.

(1) Discharging a weapon into occupied property under 14-34.1 only required reasonable grounds to believe that property was occupied rather than actual knowledge, and thus motion to dismiss was properly denied; (2) each pull of the trigger constituted a separate act adequate to support a conviction under G.S. 14-34.1, and thus trial court did not err in submitting multiple counts to the jury.

State v. Leopard, No. COA24-749 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The defendant made a complaint to 911 that he heard gunshots at his neighbor’s house. Law enforcement came to the scene and found that the neighbor was shooting targets in a safe manner. About one hour later, the defendant fired multiple bullets into his neighbor’s home. Officers subsequently arrested the defendant and retrieved a pistol and an AR-10 rifle from the defendant’s home. Officers also located spent shell casings on the defendant’s porch that appeared to come from the AR-10. The defendant was charged with four counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property and convicted of all four counts after a jury trial.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, contending that the State needed to prove the defendant had actual knowledge that the home was occupied. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, relying on precedent establishing that G.S. 14-34.1 only requires the State prove the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the property is occupied. The Court found adequate evidence of this element where the victim was using his gun range just an hour before shots were fired into his house and the light was on in the victim’s kitchen, which was visible from the defendant’s porch at the time of the shooting.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury instructions were flawed, as the defendant did not object to the instructions at trial and did not allege plain error on appeal. The Court deemed the argument abandoned given that plain error must be specifically and distinctly argued where defendant does not object at trial.

Finally, the Court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by engaging in judicial fact finding to determine that multiple shots were fired. The defendant specifically objected to the trial court’s decision to submit four charges to the jury instead of one. The Court stated that the defendant’s argument was a “creative but misguided” attempt to challenge the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Court then addressed the question of whether a quick succession of gunshots should be treated as one shot and one crime, or four distinct crimes. The Court stressed that the weapon at issue, an AR-10 rifle, was a semi-automatic weapon and that such a weapon required that the defendant employ his thought processes each time he pulled and released the trigger to shoot. The Court relied on precedent providing that each pull of the trigger constitutes a separate act supporting a conviction under G.S. 14-34.1. Finding sufficient evidence in the record to support four pulls of the trigger, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of multiplicity.

Motion to suppress was properly denied where information in search warrant affidavit was not stale, the information was obtained from reliable, named citizens rather than anonymous informants, and officers were able to corroborate the information through investigation.

State v. Stevens, No. COA24-584 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). Charles Mills was spending the night at his wife’s residence on February 15, 2022. The two were separated, but he was staying there because she had recently broken up with her ex-boyfriend, the defendant. The defendant came to the door late at night and banged on the door, demanding entry. Mr. Mills and his wife refused, and the defendant left. Subsequently, Mr. Mills was driving away from the house and saw the defendant following him in a white Range Rover. The defendant shot three bullets at Mr. Mills’s car, and a bullet entered the trunk liner. Mr. Mills texted his wife after the incident.

During the investigation of the crime, Mr. Mills’s wife provided surveillance footage of the defendant violently kicking her front door just prior to the shooting while holding a shotgun.

Officers saw the defendant leaving his home in the white Range Rover nine days later, on February 24, 2022. Defendant’s son was driving the car, and officers arrested the defendant after he was dropped off. Officers did not find a gun on the defendant. Meanwhile, the son returned to the defendant’s house and pulled into the garage. Officers secured the scene and applied for a search warrant to search the house, the Range Rover, and a red Corvette parked at the house. Upon execution of the warrant, officers found multiple weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently charged with multiple gun and drug offenses.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the search of his home and two vehicles. After a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion as to the house and the Range Rover, but granted the motion as to the Corvette. A jury trial then began, but the defendant pled guilty three days later mid-trial. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the defendant gave notice to the State of his intent to appeal the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. The trial court entered judgments and the defendant subsequently filed written notice of appeal

First, the Court addressed whether the defendant had properly preserved the denial of his motion to suppress for appellate review. The State contended he had not, as he did not object to the evidence when it was presented at trial, nor did he object to the final ruling. However, the Court concluded that there was no need for the defendant to object at trial, since the case was resolved with a guilty plea. The Court found that the defendant complied with the requirement under State v. Tew that he give notice to the State of his intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress by including language to that effect in the plea agreement. Thus, the issue was properly preserved.

The Court then addressed the merits of the motion to suppress. The defendant mainly argued that the nine-day delay between the incident and the application for a search warrant rendered the affidavit stale. The defendant also argued that there was an insufficient nexus between the shooting incident and the defendant’s house and Range Rover.

The Court disagreed, concluding that the case differed significantly from cases cited by the defendant in which a confidential informant provided information serving as the basis for a search warrant, but the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked information as to when the CI developed the information. In the present case, the lead detective was directly involved in the investigation of the shooting that culminated in the arrest and search, and the detective did not fail to state the date the information was obtained. The Court determined that probable cause was supported by the affidavit where (1) the detective was able to observe the defendant in possession of a firearm on the night of the shooting through surveillance footage; (2) Mr. Mills provided a first-hand account of the defendant shooting at him from the white Range Rover, and (3) the account was corroborated by Mr. Mills’s text message to his wife and the bullet hole in his car. Furthermore, the Court found that the information was not stale given that the shooting incident took place nine days prior to the application for a search warrant, which was significantly less than the two- to three-month delay in a case where the affidavit was deemed stale. The Court concluded it was reasonable to expect that evidence of the crime would be found in the defendant’s home or Range Rover, especially given that Mr. Mills’s wife stated that the defendant was known to regularly carry a gun, and the defendant did not have a gun in his possession when he was arrested.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the affidavit was inadequate because the information on which it was based did not come from known and reliable informants. The Court stressed that the information did not come from anonymous informants but rather from named individuals whose accounts were corroborated by video footage and physical evidence of the shooting. The detective was also able to corroborate the information through his investigation.

Where the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon because there was no conflict in the evidence as to whether the injury was serious.

State v. Wagner, No. COA24-852 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). During an altercation, the defendant stabbed the victim twice in the back, once under the arm, and once in the stomach. The victim was hospitalized for about three months and was initially in the ICU with a breathing tube. The defendant was charged and tried for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. At the charge conference, the defendant requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court declined to give the instruction, instead instructing the jury that the stab wound was a serious injury per se. The defendant was convicted of the charged offense and appealed.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, finding that it was appropriate for the trial court to remove the element of serious injury from consideration where the evidence did not conflict as to that element and where reasonable minds could not differ as to the serious nature of the injuries.

Trial court properly declined to give instruction on justification for possession of a firearm by a felon where evidence showed the defendant possessed the firearm before and after the incident; prosecutor’s statements in closing argument insinuating that defendant lied in court were improper but not so grossly improper as to constitute prejudicial error.

State v. Wright, No. COA24-863 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The defendant was working with a family friend to remodel a service station. As the defendant walked out of the store, he and the decedent had an argument. The decedent stated he wanted to fight the defendant. The family friend intervened and the two men walked away from each other. The decedent started to drive away, but then drove by the front of the store and again asked to fight the defendant. The defendant went to his van, retrieved a gun, and started shooting at the decedent. The decedent was shot from behind multiple times, and the defendant chased the decedent, choking him and stabbing him with a large knife. The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a felon after a jury trial.

On appeal, the defendant first argued that the jury should have been instructed on the defense of justification to possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to State v. Mercer, 373 N.C. 459, 463-64 (2020). The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the defendant was not entitled to the jury instruction on justification because (1) evidence showing that a convicted felon possessed a firearm before an altercation precludes the instruction, and (2) a defendant loses entitlement to the instruction by continuing to possess the firearm after the threat has passed. Because the evidence showed that the defendant possessed the firearm before the altercation and continued to possess it afterwards, he could not satisfy the first element of Mercer requiring imminent and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time of possession.

Second, the defendant argued that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were grossly improper. The Court of Appeals agreed that the comments regarding the defendant “com[ing] up with a story” that was “[n]ot true” were improper in that they insinuated that the defendant lied during his testimony. The Court admonished counsel and the State to avoid such comments. However, the Court concluded that the remarks were not so grossly improper that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial given the relative brevity of the comments and the overwhelming evidence supporting the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Thus, the Court found no prejudicial error.