No Take-Backs: Missouri Courts Reaffirm Limits on Appealing from Consent Judgments

Two recent decisions from the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri—Weiss v. Weiss and Steele v. Hartman—offer a clear and consistent reminder to practitioners: parties cannot appeal a judgment entered by consent, unless they timely raise the issue of procedural unconscionability claiming that the settlement agreement upon which the consent judgment was based was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily.

Weiss v. Weiss: A Voluntary Settlement Agreement and Subsequent Consent Judgment May Be Challenged on Appeal Only With Timely Filed Post-Judgement Motions Raising Issues of Procedural Unconscionability

In Weiss v. Weiss, No. ED112738, the Eastern District held that a spouse who agreed to a marital settlement—and then consented to the entry of judgment based upon that agreement—was not an “aggrieved party” under § 512.020 and, therefore, lacked standing to appeal.

Husband and Wife negotiated and entered into a marital settlement agreement.  The settlement agreement was drafted by Wife’s attorney and signed by the parties in the office of Wife’s attorney.  After the trial court entered judgment approving the parties’ marital settlement agreement, Wife filed three post-judgment motions challenging the consent judgment. Two of the post-judgment motions challenged the fairness of the agreement’s terms and sought to reopen the record relating to the distribution of marital property.  In the remaining post-judgment motion, Wife sought a new trial and to set aside the consent judgment, alleging that she lacked the mental capacity to voluntarily enter into the settlement agreement and consent to the entry of judgment upon that agreement due to a prior head injury.

The Court held:

• The timely filed first post-judgment motion filed on February 26, 2024, challenged only the substance of the terms of the settlement agreement, claiming the terms were unfair.  Wife’s motion did not challenge the formation of the settlement agreement—only the fairness of the terms.  Because Wife did not raise any claim of procedural unconscionability in her post-judgment motion, under Missouri law, Wife did not have the status of an “aggrieved party,” which was required to have standing to bring an appeal under Section 512.020.
• In her second timely filed post-judgment motion filed March 4, 2024, Wife raised a procedural challenge to the formation of the marital settlement agreement, claiming that she lacked the capacity to voluntarily consent to and enter the agreement due to head injuries she had suffered prior to entering into the settlement agreement.  The Court explained that the allegation of procedural unconscionability could satisfy the requirements that Wife was an “aggrieved party” under Missouri law, which would provide Wife with the necessary standing to appeal the consent judgment under Section 512.020.  Matter of N.S.M. v. McShannon, 523 S.W.3d 584 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).
• Wife’s third post-judgment motion to set aside the judgment was filed on May 8, 2024, more than 30 days after the entry of the judgment.  Under Rules 75.01 and 78.04, this post-judgment motion was untimely filed, which deprived the trial court of any authority to rule on the motion. Accordingly, any ruling by the trial court was void, and the appellate court would not consider Wife’s point on appeal.

Although the Court found that Wife had standing to appeal the judgment under the post-judgment motion timely filed on March 4, 2024, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the marital settlement agreement to have been entered knowingly and voluntarily by Wife and Husband. The record showed extensive discovery and counsel involvement, and the trial court made explicit credibility findings supporting the agreement’s fairness.

Steele v. Hartman: Voluntary Settlement and Consent Judgment Cuts Off Right to Appeal

In Steele v. Hartman, No. WD87506, the Western District applied the same principles as discussed in Weiss v. Weiss to reject a father’s appeal of a consent judgment awarding visitation rights to maternal grandparents.

Father had initially contested Grandparents’ standing to petition for visitation rights, based on an adoption of his child (Grandparent’s grandchild) by his new wife after the death of his first wife, the child’s biological mother. After the trial court denied Father’s motions and the trial court began hearing testimony, the parties entered into a consent judgment granting Grandparents visitation rights.  Father signed and confirmed the consent judgment in open court. Father then appealed the entry of the consent judgment alleging the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss Grandparents’ Petition for Visitation due to lack of standing.

The Court held:

• Father was not an “aggrieved party” by the consent judgment to which he agreed. Under § 512.020, a party must be “aggrieved” to bring an appeal. Where the parties bring a settlement agreement to the court and ask for consent judgment, the court is not making any judicial determination as to the facts or law, but is merely reciting and memorializing the parties agreement.  As such, parties who expressly consent to the entry of a judgment on the terms of a settlement to which they agreed lack standing as an “aggrieved party” to appeal that judgment.
• The issue of standing, while ordinarily preserved even when raised for the first time on appeal, must still be tied to an appealable judgment. By agreeing to the consent judgment, Father forfeited his right to appeal the standing issue.

The Court emphasized that while a party may raise standing at any time, the right to appeal is statutorily limited to parties “aggrieved” by a judgment.  Here, Father stipulated to the facts supporting visitation and consented to the entry of the judgment. As such, Father had no statutory right to appeal under Section 512.020 —even if he continued to believe the court lacked jurisdiction.

Key Takeaways

• Consent means closure. When parties voluntarily enter into a settlement and subsequent consent judgment, they are not “aggrieved” under Missouri law and cannot appeal—unless they raise issues of procedural unconscionability by which that consent was obtained.

• Substance vs. procedure matters. A challenge to the fairness of settlement terms does not support an appeal unless accompanied by a timely, credible claim that the party lacked the capacity or voluntariness required to consent.

• Deadlines matter. Post-judgment motions must be filed within 30 days under Rules 75.01 and 78.04. Untimely motions are void, and any trial court ruling on them is without legal effect.

• Standing may be preserved, but not when waived by agreement. A party cannot invoke jurisdictional challenges to reverse the entry of a judgment to which they explicitly approved.

Both cases illustrate the enduring force of Missouri’s rule against appealing from voluntary consent judgments—and the narrow paths that remain open for challenging consent when procedural fairness is at issue.