The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by a retired Sanford, Florida firefighter, concluding as a retiree she could not bring a disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for post-employment benefits. The decision resolves a circuit split on whether Title I of the ADA applies to retirees.
The suit was brought by former Sanford firefighter Karyn Stanley. Stanley began her employment with the Sanford Fire Department in 1999. At that time, the City provided health insurance coverage until age 65 to two categories of retirees: those who completed 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the City revised its policy to limit disability retirees to 24 months of post-retirement health coverage.
Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinsons in 2016, and retired on a non-line of duty disability pension in 2018, after 19 years of service. She received 24 months of health coverage in accordance with the 2003 policy. Stanley filed suit, alleging that the policy violated the ADA by treating disability retirees differently from those who retired with 25 years of service.
The U.S. District Court dismissed Stanley’s ADA claim, finding that she was not a “qualified individual” at the time the alleged discrimination occurred because she was no longer employed and was not seeking re-employment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We covered the Eleventh Circuit decision when it was decided back in 2023. More on that here.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that under the Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must be a “qualified individual,” defined as someone who “holds or desires” a job and is capable of performing its essential functions. The Court concluded that this definition does not include retirees who are not seeking re-employment. Quoting from the decision:
- Congress has made it unlawful to “discriminate against” someone who “can perform the essential functions of” the job she “holds or desires.”
- Those present-tense verbs signal that §12112(a) protects individuals who, with or without reasonable accommodation, are able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination.
- Conversely, those verbs tend to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination.
- Reinforcing this assessment is the statute’s definition of “reasonable accommodation.” Title I, recall, prohibits discrimination against an individual who can perform essential job functions “with or without reasonable accommodation.”
- And a “reasonable accommodation,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restructuring,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies.”
- Those kinds of accommodations make perfect sense when it comes to current employees or applicants.
- But it is hard to see how they might apply to retirees who do not hold or seek a job.
- To sum up, we hold that, to prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based discrimination.
The Court acknowledged a split among the circuits on this issue. The Second and Third Circuits had previously allowed claims by retirees under Title I of the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit, along with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, had held that the ADA does not cover former employees who no longer hold or seek employment.
The Court noted that Stanley did not allege that she was subjected to discrimination while she was still a “qualified individual” under the ADA. Although the government argued that she could have asserted a claim based on events that occurred between her diagnosis and her retirement, the Court found that her complaint did not include such allegations and that she had disavowed that theory in her appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Court’s decision was limited to Title I of the ADA. Stanley had also asserted claims under other federal and state laws, which were not at issue before the Court.
Here is a copy of the decision.
