The Illinois Appellate Court has affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a negligence suit brought by a motorist who was injured when her vehicle was struck by a fire department ambulance en route to a call. Gina Postula claims her vehicle was hit by a City of La Salle Fire Department ambulance on April 27, 2023.
Postila sued the apparatus driver, Tyler Blackard, and the City of LaSalle, for negligence, alleging that the ambulance failed to stop at a stop sign. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit based on immunity under both the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act and the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act.
The trial court granted the defense’s motion, finding that §5-106 of the Tort Immunity Act barred the claims. That section immunizes local public entities and employees from liability for injuries caused by negligent operation of emergency vehicles while responding to emergency calls—except in cases of willful and wanton conduct. Postila’s attorney orally requested leave to file an amended complaint add a claim based upon the willful and wanton conduct of Blackard. The court denied that request.
On appeal, Postula argued that the immunity should not apply because Blackard failed to stop or slow down for the stop sign, did not have his siren activated, and was not providing actual medical care at the time. She also argued that the court erred in denying her leave to amend the complaint.
The Appellate Court rejected both arguments. The court concluded that the Tort Immunity Act squarely applied, because the ambulance was responding to an emergency call and Blackard was acting within the scope of his employment. The court also held that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend, as Postula’s counsel could not articulate any additional facts to support a claim of willful and wanton conduct. Quoting from the decision:
- The trial court asked plaintiff’s attorney what additional facts he would allege in a proposed amended complaint to establish willful and wanton conduct, and plaintiff’s attorney stated:
- “We would—well, we would have to consult with plaintiff and see if the court is willing to allow us to do that. So, you know, I—know it’s—it’s, you know, we—it may seem like a stretch to the court, but, you know, plaintiff in this instance, since we can’t stand—the court believes we can’t stand on our pleadings, you know, if we could be allowed to amend the complaint to at least get, you know, one last—you know, another bite at the apple, one last chance, you know, to try to, you know, I think pursue this cause of action.”
- A defendant is guilty of willful and wanton conduct, as defined in the Tort Immunity Act and under established Illinois case law, if the defendant has engaged in a course of action that shows either an actual or deliberate intention to harm or an utter indifference to, or conscious disregard for, the safety of others or their property.
- Whether conduct is willful and wanton depends on the circumstances of each case and is normally a question of fact for the trier of fact to decide.
- Nevertheless, the trial court may decide the issue and hold as a matter of law that a public employee’s actions do not constitute willful and wanton conduct where no other contrary conclusion may be drawn from the record presented.
- After reviewing the record in the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s oral motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
- [W]hen plaintiff’s attorney was asked further at the hearing on the motion to dismiss about his request for leave to amend, he was unable to state any specific additional facts that he would allege to try to plead a claim or claims that would be based upon the willful and wanton conduct of Blackard in operating the ambulance.
- Although plaintiff suggests on appeal that Blackard was not sounding the ambulance’s siren shortly before the accident occurred, as defendants correctly note, such an act or omission, by itself, generally does not constitute willful and wanton conduct.
- Nor does an ambulance driver’s failure to stop at a stop sign prior to entering an intersection, in and of itself.
- For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County.
Here is a copy of the decision:
